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EXTRATERRITORIALITY BY OTHER
MEANS: HOW LABOR LAW SNEAKS
ACROSS BORDERS, CONQUERS MINDS,





Labor lawyers generally believe that each country‟s labor law, for better or 
worse, expresses its fundamental values and reflects its historic experience; that 
states can neither import nor export labor law because of the unique 
characteristics of each country‟s legal and industrial relations systems;
1
 and
that the doctrine of extraterritoriality
2
 shields each state‟s labor law from the
intrusion of others, thus ensuring that each can pursue its social and economic 
development in the manner it thinks best. While labor lawyers who hold these 
views are genuinely respectful of national sovereignty, some also chafe under 
its restrictions. They believe that the extraterritoriality doctrine unduly limits 
the capacity of a state to protect the labor rights of its own citizens while they 
are employed abroad. They are also concerned that a state cannot punish the 
businesses it has incorporated for engaging in exploitative labor practices when 
operating in foreign countries, thereby harming workers in those countries as 
well as undercutting labor standards at home.
3
This Article challenges this state-centered description of labor law and 
* University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University. I am 
grateful for the insightful comments on an early draft provided by Peer Zumbansen, 
Katherine Stone, and Susan Bisom-Rapp, the able research assistance of Caroline 
Markiewicz, and the helpful advice of the two senior editors of the Stanford Law and Policy 
Review assigned to work on my manuscript. 
1. The issue is canvassed extensively in RETHINKING COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW:
BRIDGING THE PAST AND THE FUTURE (Benjamin Aaron & Katherine Van Wezel Stone eds., 
2007). 
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 151 (2005); Lance
Compa, Pursuing International Labour Rights in U.S. Courts: New Uses for Old Tools, 57 
INDUS. REL. 48 (2002); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four 
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT‟L L. 987 (1995).  
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impoverished view of extraterritoriality. It suggests that transnational flows of 
technology and capital, goods and services, and ideas and information have 
brought in their wake changes in political economy and social relations that 
have transformed regimes of public and workplace governance in all countries. 
It proposes that the extraterritoriality doctrine operates, if at all, only in the 
formal sense of not allowing one state to overtly project its law into the 
territory of another. But extraterritoriality does little to prevent the rules 
governing employment relations in one country from taking root elsewhere, 
from shaping foreign labor market norms, institutions, and practices, and from 
being reproduced, in their original or mutant forms, in foreign systems of labor 
law. The result is the extraterritorial projection “by other means” of labor law 
and policy—a form of extraterritoriality that has the potential to enhance as 
well as undermine labor standards in global enterprises. 
This challenge, in turn, rests on two premises. 
The first is that all workplaces tend to generate their own law.
4
 The “law of
the workplace” thus comprises not only state labor law but also (and more 
importantly) formal contractual understandings; workplace customs explicitly 
acted on and implicitly accepted as binding by workers and managers; and low-
visibility behavioral norms embedded in operating manuals, daily routines, and 
workplace cultures. The law of the workplace has long been understood by 
industrial relations practitioners and socio-legal scholars to exist apart from—
and sometimes in contravention of—state law. Indeed, given the unwillingness 
or incapacity of states to regulate the labor practices of transnational 
corporations, such corporations are relatively free to develop their own 
normative regimes. The law of the workplace is therefore not unduly influenced 
by national legal systems, though for their own reasons corporations may 
choose whether and to what extent they will comply with the local law of the 
countries in which they operate. Consequently, to describe labor law as 
operating extraterritorially is only to identify one more way (amongst many) in 
which it departs from the formal state-centered paradigm of law to which most 
jurists subscribe.  
The second premise is that “labor” is not a discrete domain of law and 
policy.
5
 While a central preoccupation of labor law is indeed to regulate the
4. See generally H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1
(1996); Harry Arthurs, Landscape and Memory: Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and 
Globalization, in ADVANCING THEORY IN LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 21 (Ton Wilthagen ed., 1998) [hereinafter Arthurs, Landscape and 
Memory]; Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy, 22 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001); Harry W. Arthurs, Understanding Labour Law: The Debate 
over “Industrial Pluralism,” 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 83 (1985) [hereinafter Arthurs, 
Understanding Labour Law]. 
5. See Harry W. Arthurs, What Immortal Hand or Eye?—Who Will Redraw the
Boundaries of Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND
MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 373 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006).  
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balance of power between workers and employers, many of the factors that 
actually determine that balance are not conventionally perceived to be “labor” 
related. Trade and taxation, homeland security and health insurance, and 
insolvency and immigration laws and policies (to name but a few) have 
profound effects on labor markets in general, and therefore on particular 
economic sectors, enterprises, and workplaces. The result is that in many 
advanced economies—especially those where global corporations originate and 
dominate—labor law and policy become an incidental by-product, an 
externality, of other political preoccupations. The bargaining power of unions, 
the enforcement of labor standards legislation, and the provision of 
employment opportunities for excluded minorities are often determined in a 
practical sense by public policies whose primary purpose is to encourage or 
discourage consumption, pacify or punish particular political constituencies, or 
realign relations with foreign trading partners. Nor, given the declining political 
influence and bargaining strength of unions in most advanced economies, can 
workers count on recouping at the workplace level losses sustained in debates 
at the political level. And, of course, the situation of workers in most 
developing economies is even worse: they are not citizens of the metropolitan 
countries where important decisions are made that affect their jobs, are often 
denied a voice even in the political system of their own country, and seldom 
wield much power at the workplace level.  
Thus, the “extraterritoriality” debate is not merely over the extent to which 
states have the right to project their labor laws beyond their territorial borders 
or, for that matter, to exempt foreign corporations from their labor laws. It is 
more fundamentally a debate over the multiple sources and meanings of “law,” 
the permeable boundaries of “labor” as a policy domain, and the effects of 
globalization on these two difficult issues.  
In the next Part, I introduce this debate by briefly examining the legal 
doctrine of extraterritoriality, by providing historical examples of states that 
have actively sought to project their labor laws into foreign territories, and by 
showing that labor laws do operate extraterritorially (with varying degrees of 
success), legal-doctrinal objections to the contrary notwithstanding. Then, in 
successive Parts, I address what I have referred to as the “fundamentals” of the 
debate, by describing how labor laws in fact “sneak across borders” relatively 
unconstrained by the extraterritoriality doctrine; how they “conquer the minds” 
of foreign legislators and policy makers, workers and managers, and their 
advocates and allies; and how they come to “control workplaces abroad.” These 
are the “other means” by which extraterritoriality is accomplished. In a 
concluding Part, I revisit the issue of globalization, and suggest that since 
extraterritoriality “by other means” is probably inevitable, we had better 
understand its modalities and consequences. 
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I. THE MULTIPLE MANIFESTATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A. Extraterritoriality as Legal Doctrine 
The legal doctrine of extraterritoriality has three distinct aspects. First, it 
prima facie prevents states from applying their laws to anyone not physically 
present within their own territorial boundaries.
6
 Not surprisingly, then, states 
may not enact laws that purport to govern employment relations in another 
country. To do so would clearly infringe the sovereignty of that country. 
Second, by way of exception, states may regulate the conduct and protect the 
rights of their individual and corporate citizens while abroad so long as they do 
not require them to violate the law of the country where they live, work, or 
carry on business.
7
 Consequently, if a state does wish to subject its expatriate 
workers and employers to the extraterritorial reach of its labor laws it may do 
so by making this explicit in domestic legislation or by demonstrating that their 
conduct abroad has significant effects at home.
8
 And third, the 
extraterritoriality doctrine may be qualified by treaty or international law so as 
to confer on the expatriate citizens of one state full or partial immunity from the 
law of another state in which they work or live. This type of extraterritoriality 




  6. For a canonical statement of the doctrine, see Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in Regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and 
Especially in Regard to Marriages, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMON LAW 
CANADA: CASES, TEXT, AND MATERIALS 14, 14-15 (Nicholas Rafferty et al. eds., 2003) (“No 
State or nation can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or 
persons not resident therein . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMAN HILL KAY & LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS: CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 733 (6th ed. 2001) (“The „effects doctrine‟ . . . is 
generally treated as an aspect of territoriality, and a state may regulate activity occurring 
outside the state if that activity has or is intended to have effects within it.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, supra note 3, at 987; cf. LaToya S. Brown, The Title VII 
Tug-of-War: Application of U.S. Employment Discrimination Law Extraterritorially, 40 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT‟L L. 833 (2007); Todd Keithley, Does the National Labor Relations Act 
Extend to Americans Who Are Temporarily Abroad?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2135 (2005); 
Stephen B. Moldof, The Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Activities and Employees Outside 
the United States, 17 LAB. LAW. 417 (2002). 
9. The most notorious example involved the establishment of “foreign concessions” in 
Shanghai, Tienjin, and other Chinese cities under the notorious “unequal treaties” imposed 
by the United States, Japan, and various European powers from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards. These “concessions” were enclaves in which Chinese law was displaced by the law 
of the foreign power operating extraterritorially. Since they were major commercial, 
manufacturing, and shipping centers, the same cities were often the site of labor organization 
and nationalist agitation. See generally S.A. SMITH, LIKE CATTLE AND HORSES: NATIONALISM 
AND LABOUR IN SHANGHAI 1895-1927 (2002). Contemporary examples of extraterritoriality 
usually involve bilateral arrangements whereby states agree to exempt each other’s citizens 
from complying with their law in narrowly specified circumstances. Examples include the 
following: conventions against double taxation, see, e.g., Convention Between Canada and 
the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., 
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full or partial immunities for foreign corporations may be established 




B. Extraterritoriality in Historical Context 
The great trading companies that undertook the first wave of globalization, 
from the seventeenth century onwards, did not hesitate to impose their own 
“law” on their employees, whether dispatched from the mother country or 
employed locally.
11
 Nor did colonial courts and administrations shrink from 
holus bolus importation of labor laws from their home countries, however ill-
suited to local conditions. Nor did colonial legislators hesitate to replicate in 
local form legislation clearly borrowed from the motherland—the U.K. Master 
and Servant Acts being a particularly well-documented case in point.
12
 Nor did 
newly independent nations always shrug off colonial labor laws when the flag 
of the metropolitan power was lowered.
13
 Even post-apartheid South Africa 
redesigned its collective labor laws through extensive “borrowings and 
bendings” from other national systems, in the hope of both enabling its labor 
market institutions to operate in the context of a global economy, and ensuring 
its workers freedoms and protections comparable to those enjoyed by workers 
in other democracies.
14
 In fact, attempts to import labor market policies, 
 
Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087; agreements providing credit for old age pensions earned 
abroad, see, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of Canada with Respect to Social Security, U.S.-Can., May 22, 1981, 35 
U.S.T. 3403; and treaties providing for mutual recognition of professional credentials, see, 
e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 
Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
10. See infra Part III. 
11. See, e.g., EDITH BURLEY, SERVANTS OF THE HONOURABLE COMPANY: WORK, 
DISCIPLINE, AND CONFLICT IN THE HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY, 1770-1879, at 19-63 (1997); 
Russell Smandych & Rick Linden, Administering Justice Without the State: A Study of the 
Private Justice System of the Hudson’s Bay Company to 1800, 11 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 21 
(1996).  
12. See generally MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE, 
1562-1955 (Douglas Hay & Paul Craven eds., 2004).  
13. See, e.g., ANTHONY CLAYTON & DONALD C. SAVAGE, GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR IN 
KENYA 1895-1963 (1975); N.S.K. TUMBO ET AL., LABOUR IN TANZANIA (1977); Christopher 
Candland, The Cost of Incorporation: Labor Institutions, Industrial Restructuring, and the 
New Trade Union Strategies in India and Pakistan, in THE POLITICS OF LABOR IN A GLOBAL 
AGE 69 (C. Candland, R. Sil & M. Murillo eds., 2001); N. Adeti Bastine, The Relevance of 
Freedom of Association for Ghanaian Labour Law (2000) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, 
Osgoode Hall Law School) (on file with author). 
14. See Clive Thompson, Borrowing and Bending: The Development of South Africa‟s 
Unfair Labour Practice Jurisprudence, in THE CHANGING FACE OF LABOUR LAW AND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM FOR CLYDE W. SUMMERS 109 (Roger Blanpain & 
Manfred Weiss eds., 1993); see also Bob Hepple, Can Collective Labour Law Transplants 
Work? The South African Example, 20 INDUS L.J. 1 (1999). 
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institutions, and laws from one state to another have been so frequent that 
debate over the feasibility of “transplantation” has become a dominant theme of 
comparative labor law scholarship.
15
 
Moreover, the transplantation of labor law and policy has featured 
prominently in international politics. Thus, in 1944, American labor law 
significantly influenced the ILO‟s Declaration of Philadelphia
16
 and 
subsequently other labor-related international regimes
17
 (though apparently not 
the U.S. Congress itself, which declined either to ratify this text or reform U.S 
labor legislation in accordance with its terms).
18
 During the immediate postwar 
period, the United States sought to export its distinctive New Deal vision of 
industrial democracy to other countries. It had greater success in this project as 
a liberating power in the Philippines
19
 than as an occupying power in Japan.
20
 
But it had virtually no success at all during the Cold War in Latin America or 




15. See RETHINKING COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW: BRIDGING THE PAST AND THE FUTURE, 
supra note 1. 
16. The Preamble to the Declaration of Philadelphia declares that “labor is not a 
commodity”—language taken from the Clayton Act of 1914 § 6, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 
Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000)). It characterizes labor rights as 
“freedom of association” and “freedom of expression,” paralleling a contemporaneous, if 
short-lived, movement in American jurisprudence, and it reproduces FDR‟s famous phrase, 
“the war against want.” Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purpose of the International 
Labour Organization (Declaration of Philadelphia) Part I, Oct. 9, 1946, 15 U.N.T.S. 35. 
17. For example, the 1947 Havana Charter of the proposed International Trade 
Organization (ITO) committed member states to “achieve full and productive employment,” 
to “take fully into account the rights of workers,” and to “take whatever measures may be 
appropriate and feasible to eliminate [unfair] labor conditions”—all objectives consistent 
with the “post-war compromise” then emerging in the United States and other western 
democracies. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, arts. 3 & 7, Mar. 24, 
1948, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78. And trace influences of then-prevailing American labor policy 
can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 20 & 23, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) and in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 
50 arts. 6-9, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966). 
18. The United States has not ratified key ILO conventions dealing with freedom of 
association and protection of the right to organize (Convention 87) and the right to organize 
and to engage in collective bargaining (Convention 98). See Steve Charnovitz, The ILO 
Convention on Freedom of Association and Its Future in the United States, 102 AM. J. INT‟L 
L. 90 (2008). Indeed, Congressional opposition led to rejection of the Havana Charter and to 
a virtual U.S. boycott of the ILO for an extended period. See Robert W. Cox, Labor and 
Hegemony, 31 INT‟L ORG. 385, 394-400 (1977); Robert W. Cox, Labor and Transnational 
Relations, 25 INT‟L ORG. 554 (1971); Stephen Schlossberg, United States‟ Participation in 
the ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48 (1989). 
19. See generally LABOR CODE, bk. V, Pres. Dec. No. 442, as amended. 
20. See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, JAPAN‟S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR 
LAW ch. 2 (1984). 
21. See John Windmuller, The Foreign Policy Conflict in American Labor, 82 POL. SCI. 
Q. 205 (1967); see also Cliff Welch, Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in Brazilian 
Unions 1945-1965, 30 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 61 (1995). 
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during the 1970s, did America‟s unique labor law system survive an attempted 
transplant into the body politic of its close legal relative, leading ally, and 
significant trading partner, the United Kingdom.
22
 At least for a time 
America‟s Cold War rival, the Soviet Union, had greater success in extending 
the extraterritorial influence of its labor policies, not because it slavishly 
replicated them in the laws of the countries it first liberated and then 
dominated, but because it was able to enforce conformity with the ideology that 
underpinned them.
23
 As we now know, however, the Soviet experiment with 
“extraterritoriality by other means” contained the seeds of its own destruction. 
Nonetheless, America—for good or ill—continues to project its own labor 
policies abroad by embedding them (often in conflicting versions) in foreign 
policy pronouncements,
24
 in trade legislation and treaties,
25
 and in the 
normative architecture of the so-called “Washington Consensus” and the 
analytical repertoires of international agencies such as the World Bank.
26
 
Still, despite this history of mostly unsuccessful attempts at 
extraterritoriality, labor law has sometimes played—and can play—an 
important role in achieving economic integration across jurisdictional 
boundaries. As Mark Barenberg reminds us, the adoption by the United States 
of national labor legislation during the New Deal helped to construct the huge 
domestic market for goods and services that contributed so much to America‟s 
 
22. See William B. Gould IV, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on 
the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 81 YALE L.J. 1421 (1972); Hamish R. Sandison, A 
Rejected Transplant: The British Industrial Relations Act (1971-1974), 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 
247 (1979). 
23. See generally Michal Sewerynski, Prospects for the Development of Labor Law 
and Social Security Law in Central and Eastern Europe in the Twenty-First Century, 18 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 182 (1996). 
24. See, e.g., Windmuller, supra note 21.  
25. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRUNDT, TRADE CONDITIONS AND LABOR RIGHTS: U.S. 
INITIATIVES, DOMINICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN RESPONSES 56-75 (1998); Lance Compa, 
Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25 LAW & POL‟Y INT‟L BUS. 165 
(1993); Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. 
Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 253 (1988). 
26. A very recent example: In 2009, the Democratic-controlled U.S. Congress enacted 
legislation requiring the U.S.-nominated directors of several World Bank agencies to “use 
[their] voice and vote” to persuade those agencies to cease using an “Employing Workers 
Indicator” —introduced in 2003 during the Republican ascendancy—that gave the highest 
credit-worthiness ratings to countries with the lowest levels of worker protection, and thus 
forced many developing countries to deregulate their labor markets. The new indices 
proposed by Congress would “fairly represent the value of internationally recognized 
workers‟ rights, including core labor standards, in creating a stable and favorable 
environment for attracting private investment . . . .” International Financial Institutions Act 
22 U.S.C. § 262p-9(a) (2006). However, President Obama, in a subsequent “signing 
statement,” rejected this incursion by Congress into the presidential prerogative to conduct 
foreign affairs. See Lawmakers Warn Obama Not to Overuse Signing Statements, 
GOVERNMENTEXECUTIVE.COM, July 21, 2009, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0709/ 
072109cdpm2.htm. 
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postwar growth and prosperity.
27
 Countries in today‟s global economy, he 
notes, bear something of the same relationship to each other that American 
states did prior to the adoption of an expansive interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution: the absence of a common pattern of labor 
regulation produced pressures for a “race to the bottom,” as jurisdictions with 
low labor standards sought to attract investment and jobs from those with high 
standards. Conversely—as Barenberg and others argue—the development of 
common normative structures across jurisdictional boundaries may promote 
international worker solidarity and cooperation, facilitate worker mobility, and 




Canada‟s experience with the extraterritorialization of American labor law 
is particularly instructive. The economies of the two countries are closely 
integrated, to the point where each is among the other‟s leading trading partners 
and sources of investment capital. Indeed, many enterprises and industries have 
operated seamlessly across the Canada-U.S. border for much of the past 
century.
29
 It is hardly surprising, then, that one of the most important initiatives 
to organize Canadian blue-collar workers in the 1930s should have originated 
with the United Auto Workers, an American-based “international” union active 
on both sides of the border.
30
 Other international unions—in mining, steel, 
transportation and other sectors—also sought to extend their reach, often in 
tandem with or in pursuit of American companies whose operations extended 
into Canada. As patterns of corporate ownership, union organization, and labor 
conflict developed in parallel in the two countries, it is not surprising that 
Canadian workers increasingly demanded protections similar to those provided 
to American unionists by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) from 1935 
onwards. These protections were extended hesitantly at first, but by 1944 
Canada had adopted its own version of the NLRA.
31
 
Surely there are few more compelling examples of “extraterritoriality by 
 
27. See Mark Barenberg, Law and Labor in the New Global Economy: Through the 
Lens of United States Federalism, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‟L L. 445 (1995). 
28. Cf. HEPPLE, supra note 3; Mark Barenberg, Labor Federalism in the United States: 
Lessons for International Labor Rights, 3 J. INT‟L ECON. L. 303 (2000).  
29. The auto industry was an early and prominent example. Cross-border industry 
integration explains the Auto Pact of 1965, which—until struck down by the WTO in 
1999—permitted autos and auto parts to move smoothly from one country to another, in 
accordance with the logic of manufacturing and marketing developed by each of the “big 
three” North American auto makers. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, U.S.-
Can., Jan. 16, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1372; see also Dimitry Anastakis, Requiem for a Trade 
Agreement: The Auto Pact at the WTO, 1999-2000, 34 CAN. BUS. L.J. 313 (2001) (analyzing 
causes of the discontinuation of the treaty). 
30. See JUDY FUDGE & ERIC TUCKER, LABOUR BEFORE THE LAW: THE REGULATION OF 
WORKERS‟ COLLECTIVE ACTION IN CANADA, 1900-1948, at 208-09 (2004); SAM GINDIN, THE 
CANADIAN AUTO WORKERS: THE BIRTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF A UNION 56-71 (1995). 
31. Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, P.C./1944-1003 (Can.); see also FUDGE & 
TUCKER, supra note 30, at 263-80. 
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other means” than this: for much of the postwar period, American-based 
corporations employing Canadian workers, and American-based unions 
representing them, were regulated by a labor law regime imported from the 
United States and adapted to the Canadian context by government and 
academic experts, many of whom were trained in American graduate schools 
and/or influenced by American scholarly literature and professional practice.
32
 
But the Canadian case is also fraught with irony. The Canadian progeny of the 
NLRA have proved (so far) to be more robust than their progenitor, as have 
Canadian unions; consequently, some American scholars, legislators and 
unionists have been considering Canadian adaptations of the Wagner Act as 
they attempt to resuscitate the original.
33
 
C. Extraterritoriality in the Context of International Economic Integration 
The Canadian case suggests that de facto integration of national economies 
may lead to de facto extraterritoriality, as one state‟s labor laws provide the 
template for strategies of labor market regulation adopted by the other. 
However, the experience of the European Union suggests the contrary. Member 
states of the European Union—while in principle committed to deep economic 
integration—have neither attempted nor achieved the same degree of 
harmonization in their labor laws that has evolved between the much less 
formally integrated Canadian and American economies.
34
 Indeed, the original 
Treaty of Rome has relatively little to say about labor law;
35
 community-wide 
labor law directives have been limited in scope and number;
36
 and decisions of 
 
32. See Harry Arthurs, National Traditions in Labor Law Scholarship: The Canadian 
Case, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‟Y J. 645, 648-49, 653-54 (2002). 
33. The Employee Free Choice Act, presently being debated by the U.S. Congress, 
proposes three main reforms based on or related to Canadian legislation: card checks rather 
than elections to establish a union‟s majority status, first-contract arbitration, and enhanced 
remedies against employer unfair labor practices. However, bitter opposition to the first of 
these has apparently led to its abandonment by senior labor leaders. See Steven Greenhouse, 
Union Head Would Back Bill Without Card Check, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at B3. 
34. See generally PHIL SYRPIS, EU INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC LABOUR LAW (2007) 
(discussing EU efforts to standardize member states‟ labor laws); Silvana Sciarra, The 
Evolution of Collective Bargaining: Observations on a Comparison in the Countries of the 
European Union, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‟Y J. 1 (2007) (reviewing the diversity of national 
collective bargaining systems in the EU member states, and their relationship to other 
aspects of labor law and policy). 
35. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 48-51, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11 (protecting primarily the free movement of workers). 
36. EU directives, inter alia, guarantee the free movement of labor among member 
states, prohibit workplace harassment and discrimination, regulate working time, establish 
rights of consultation and participation, ensure workers‟ privacy rights, and provide an 
approach to mass redundancies. In some cases, states retain the right to opt out even of this 
modest list. For access to individual enactments see European Commission, Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId= 
82&langId=en (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
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the European Court, while growing in importance, have so far had limited 
impact on the interaction of community and national labor laws.
37
 On the other 
hand, the EU‟s “open method of coordination”—systematizing the 
community‟s long-standing reliance on both “soft” and “hard” law—mandates 
structured and transparent exchanges concerning labor market issues amongst 
national experts, social partners, and policy-makers within broad community-
level policy guidelines.
38
 This has contributed, or may contribute, to several 
developments with quasi-extraterritorial implications: some approximation of 
national adherence to broad community policy (which in turn is significantly 
influenced by the leading states);
39
 the conscious imitation by some states of 
successful policy experiments originating in others (“flexicurity” is a case in 
point
40
); and the explicit borrowing of labor law institutions or doctrines 




Given that the deeply integrated EU tacitly accepts the coexistence of 
different national labor law systems, it is hardly surprising that NAFTA—much 
less deeply integrated—explicitly embraces national diversity in the labor laws 
and policies of its member states. The NAFTA “side agreement” on labor—the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)—imposes on 
 
37. See generally Claire Kilpatrick, The ECJ and Labour Law: A 2008 Retrospective, 
38 INDUS. L.J. 180 (2009). 
38. See MILENA BÜCHS, NEW GOVERNANCE IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY: THE OPEN 
METHOD OF COORDINATION 28-33, 101-03 (2007); Susana Borrás & Kerstin Jacobsson, The 
Open Method of Co-ordination and New Governance Patterns in the EU, 11 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL‟Y 185, 195-97 (2004).  
39. See Kerstin Jacobsson, Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: 
The Case of EU Employment Policy, 14 J. EUR. SOC. POL‟Y 355 (2004); David M. Trubek & 
Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the 
Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005); cf. Andrew Watt, Reform of the 
European Employment Strategy After Five Years: A Change of Course or Merely of 
Presentation?, 10 EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 117, 120 (2004) (providing a rather more skeptical 
view). 
40. Ton Wilthagen, Frank Tros & Harm van Lieshout, Towards “Flexicurity”?: 
Balancing Flexibility and Security in EU Member States (September 2003) (unpublished 
working paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133940). But see Lothar Funk, 
European Flexicurity Policies: A Critical Assessment, 24 INT‟L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. 
REL. 349 (2008). 
41. For a timely warning concerning the dangers of such borrowing, see Manfred 
Weiss, The Transformation of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in South-East Europe, 3 
S.-E. EUR. REV. FOR LAB. & SOC. AFF. 25 (1998). Nonetheless, it is clear that borrowing did 
occur. See, e.g., Larry S. Bush, Romanian Regulation of Trade Unions and Collective 
Bargaining, 32 CORNELL INT‟L L.J. 319, 359 (1999) (influence of French labor law in 
Romania); Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky, European Enlargement: A Comparative View of 
Hungarian Labour Law, in LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE 209, 233-34 
(George Bermann & Katharina Pistor eds., 2004) (influence of West European labor 
movements on Hungarian labor law). See generally LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE 
NEW EU MEMBER AND CANDIDATE STATES (Anders Etgen Reitz ed., 2007) (summary guide 
to EU labor law). 
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each member state only the obligation to conform to its own laws.
42
 And as 
matters have turned out, asymmetries of power and interests, as well as flaws in 
institutional design, have undermined the achievement even of this modest 
objective.
43
 That said, even the disappointing experience under the NAALC 
presents two potentially significant innovations for extraterritoriality: states that 
fail to apply their labor laws to their own workers run the risk of censure by 
their trading partners, and workers whose national labor laws have failed them 
may—with the help of foreign proxies and allies—call their own government to 
account in an international forum.
44
 Extraterritoriality turned inside out, one 
might say. 
D. Extraterritoriality as Social Fact 
However, as noted in my Introduction, my focus is neither on 
extraterritoriality as legal doctrine nor on state-sponsored initiatives to export 
or import labor law nor on the harmonization of national labor laws in the 
context of international economic integration. It is, rather, on the metaphorical 
achievement of extraterritoriality “by other means.” 
Why “other means”? The phrase is intended to challenge the proposition 
that labor law systems create, reproduce, and sustain themselves, that they are 
no more or less than a compendium of treaties and interstate agreements, 
statutes, and leading cases. To the contrary: in my view, labor law comprises all 
normative influences, of whatever provenance, that—for better or worse—
shape labor markets, distribute power amongst labor market actors, and affect 
their perception of what they can achieve and how best to achieve it. These 
influences may originate in a country‟s political economy, in its demography or 
culture, in its social structures or relations, or in its constitutional system or 
legal culture. But in the current context, it is important to note that they may 
also originate in the global political economy, in the institutions governing 
economic, human, and labor rights within that economy, or in relations 
amongst the transnational civil society actors that populate and animate it. 
Moreover, the normative sources of labor law may be found at the micro-
level of the workplace rather than at the macro-level of the national or global 
political economy, although the two are obviously related. They may be 
 
42. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2, Sept. 
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. 
43. See, e.g., Mario F. Bognanno & Jianfeng Lu, NAFTA‟s Labor Side Agreement: 
Withering as an Effective Labor Law Enforcement and MNC Compliance Strategy?, in 
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND GLOBAL HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGIES 18 (William N. 
Cooke ed., 2003); Rainer Dombois, Erhard Hornberger & Jens Winter, Transnational Labor 
Regulation in the NAFTA—a Problem of Institutional Design? The Case of the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the USA, Mexico and Canada, 19 
INT‟L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 421 (2003). 
44. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 21-22, 
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. 
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secreted in the interstices of corporate organization, encoded in systems of 
production and distribution, embedded in shop-floor customs and usages, or 
imbricated in patterns of quotidian relations between and amongst workers and 
managers. 
If, therefore, labor law is not so much a body of doctrine as it is a social 
fact, the same must be said of extraterritoriality. Consequently, the 
extraterritorial application of labor law is achieved “by other means” whenever 
influences emanating from outside a country shape labor law within it. 
II. CONQUERING MINDS: LABOR LAW AS A HEGEMONIC (AND COUNTER-
HEGEMONIC) PROJECT 
Thus defined, “extraterritoriality” is indeed a process of altering law, 
broadly defined, by conquering minds. As the short history cited in Part I 
suggests, extraterritoriality is therefore often associated with the hegemonic 
project of extending the ideologies of dominant nations into the political space 
and consciousness of others. But, as I will argue, the same phenomenon can 
also be understood as a counter-hegemonic project, designed to challenge 
unequal power relations in the workplace and the orthodoxies that legitimate 
them. 
In a process I have referred to as “globalization of the mind,” ideas about 
what constitutes “good” public policy percolate through transnational 
discursive communities of academics, policy makers, civil servants, business 
executives, consultants, and professionals.
45
 These individuals often attend the 
same universities, read the same literature, belong to the same organizations 
and networks, participate in the same conferences, and consciously refer to 
each other‟s ideas and experiences, often reaching across national borders to do 
so. Not surprisingly, their consensus about “good” public policy often produces 
broadly similar labor policies in different countries, albeit not necessarily 
identical labor laws. Thus, over the past three decades or so, the extraterritorial 
migration of neoliberal ideas, propagated largely in British and American 
intellectual circles,
46
 has persuaded other countries to adopt policies that have 
led to widespread deregulation of labor markets, reduction of worker 
entitlements, flexibilization of the workforce, disempowerment of unions, 
growth in income inequality, contraction of social safety nets, and the 
emergence of a new “precariat.”
47
 
However, these policies have been challenged and their consequences 
 
45. See H.W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the 
Restructuring of Legal Fields, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC‟Y 219 (1997). 
46. See, e.g., Robert Flanagan, Economic Forces, Law and World Labor Conditions, 21 
STAN. L. & POL‟Y REV. ___ (2010).  
47. Mika LaVaque-Manty, American Exceptionalism, Part 42: The Case of the Missing 
Precariat (Aug. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/ p208723_index.html). 
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condemned by other transnational discursive communities whose members are 
drawn from universities and the “chattering classes,” from unions and NGOs, 
and from social democratic or social market policy institutes and political 
movements. Their counter-hegemonic critique has mobilized coalitions of 
workers, consumers, and other civil society groups to oppose the exploitation 
of migrants in the global north, and of women and children in the global south; 
significantly improved protections for women, gays, disabled people, and 
members of racial minority groups in the advanced economies; and sparked 
interest in the creation of a new labor movement based on “social unionism” in 
both the third world and the first.
48
 
Indeed, the International Labor Organization (ILO) itself may be viewed as 
an archetypal transnational discursive community. For ninety years it has been 
attempting to improve the lot of workers by promoting discussion within its 
tripartite assembly of governmental, labor, and employer representatives. It 
publishes carefully researched reports on current labor issues, proposes 
conventions for adoption by its members, provides expert advice and training to 
assist developing countries, investigates complaints against governments that 
transgress particular conventions or “core labor rights,” and campaigns for 
“Decent Work” as the conceptual fundament of labor standards in the global 
economy.
49
 Thus, the ILO might be described as an agent of counter-
hegemonic extraterritoriality: it develops, disseminates, legitimates, and (to an 
extent) enforces normative approaches to labor issues
50
 and projects them into 
the discursive and juridical space of member states that have long been 
committed to abstaining from most forms of labor market regulation (and, in 
some cases, to ruthless suppression of labor rights).
 
Whether the ILO and other 
counter-hegemonic communities have actually achieved the world-wide 
repudiation of neoliberal labor policies and laws is another matter—one that is 
not likely to be resolved overnight. As Daniel Rogers reminds us, the 
transformation of American labor law under the New Deal was the culmination 
of fifty years of trans-Atlantic dialogue amongst progressive thinkers 
concerned with “the social question.”
51
 But if labor-backed parties in the 
advanced economies are ultimately resuscitated in some form or other, if labor 
 
48. See KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 52 (1997); Stephanie Ross, Varieties of Social Unionism: Towards a Framework 
for Comparison, 11 JUST LAB. 16 (2007); Michael Schiavone, Moody‟s Account of Social 
Movement Unionism: An Analysis, 33 CRITICAL SOC. 279 (2007). 
49. See International Labour Organization, Decent Work for All, http://www.ilo.org/ 
global/About_the_ILO/Mainpillars/WhatisDecentWork (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
 50. For a comprehensive account of such proceedings, see ILO, FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO (5th rev. ed. 2006). See also Jean-Michel 
Servais, The ILO Law and the Freedom to Strike, CAN. EMP. & LAB. L.J. (forthcoming 
2010). 
51. DANIEL T. ROGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 
(1998). 
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policies are transformed and labor laws reinvigorated, future historians may 
similarly acknowledge the contribution of interlinked global networks of 
progressive thinkers—a prime example of extraterritoriality “by other means.” 
III. SNEAKING ACROSS BORDERS 
Labor law, in all the senses in which I use the term, often crosses borders 
by stealth and takes root in countries that do not import it as a matter of 
conscious policy. 
Transnational corporations are often the vehicle of covert and/or 
unintended importation. To cite the most obvious example, a corporation may 
enter into employment contracts with employees who work abroad to the effect 
that the law of the corporation‟s home country, or some other country, will 
apply to those contracts, rather than the law of the country in which they are 
working. If the parties do not agree to this explicitly, a court may find that they 
have done so implicitly, or that applying local law would be inconvenient or 
inappropriate in the circumstances.
52
 Nor, apparently, is the host country under 
such circumstances entitled to insist on compliance with its own labor 
standards, rather than on those of the country where the enterprise originated.
53
 
In these situations, national law moves under the carapace of employment 
contracts to govern workplace relations abroad. 
To cite a less obvious (but more common) example, national law may be 
exported sub rosa because its values, assumptions, or requirements become 
embedded in the HR policies and workplace practices of transnational 
corporations.
54
 For example, corporations may develop internal procedures for 
dealing with complaints of workplace discrimination or harassment as required 
by the domestic law of their home state. These procedures are then applied 
when they, or their subsidiaries, operate abroad, whether or not required by 
local law to do so.
55
 Another example: HR practices developed by corporations 
in home countries with strong traditions of paternalism or workplace 
democracy may persist when these corporations initiate operations abroad in 
less solidaristic environments.
56
 And a third, less benign example: corporations 
 
52. See, e.g., RUTH HAYWARD, CONFLICT OF LAWS 110 (4th ed. 2006); JANET WALKER, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 598-624 (1st ed. 2006); RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 475-541 (5th ed. 2006). 
53. See, e.g., Herwig Verschueren, Cross-Border Workers in the European Internal 
Market: Trojan Horses for Member States‟ Labour and Social Security Law?, 24 INT‟L J. 
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 167 (2008). 
54. See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielson, Paying Workers or Paying Lawyers: Employee 
Termination Practices in the Unites States and Canada, 21 LAW & POL‟Y 247 (1999). 
55. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(2006). 
56. See, e.g., THOMAS BATA & SONJA SINCLAIR, BATA: SHOEMAKER TO THE WORLD 
(1990); Schon Beechler & John Zhuang Yang, The Transfer of Japanese-Style Management 
to American Subsidiaries: Contingencies, Constraints and Competencies, 25 J. INT‟L BUS. 
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whose home jurisdictions provide them with the legal or practical means to 
resist unionization may develop HR practices that ensure that they remain 
“union-free” even when they operate in more union-friendly jurisdictions.
57
 
Of course, transnational corporations seek advice from lawyers and other 
consultants in countries where they carry on business. However, while these 
consultants almost invariably advise compliance with local labor law, they 
often find ways to achieve the “extraterritorial” outcomes sought by their 
clients by exploiting weaknesses or creating ambiguities in local law. In doing 
so, as some of them acknowledge, they necessarily become agents of legal 
change, introducing elements of foreign labor law and policy into the local 
system by the way they construct transactions, interpret existing laws, or lobby 
for legislative amendments.
58
 However, in general their contribution to 
extraterritoriality is relatively modest compared to the proselytizing efforts of 
the offshore offices of U.S.-based consultants who actively attempt to persuade 
their foreign clients to adopt American-style legal concepts and strategies, 
including aggressive antiunion measures.
59
 
In short, corporate officials, lawyers, consultants, and workers whose work 
takes them literally or figuratively across national boundaries sometimes 
smuggle their national law across those boundaries in their operating manuals, 
briefcases, or lunch buckets. On occasion, however, “smuggling” is actively 
encouraged or passively acquiesced to by host states. In the case of export 
processing zones (EPZs) for example, foreign firms are formally granted full or 
partial immunity from local labor law as a quid pro quo for the investment, 
jobs, and know-how they bring with them.
60
 In the best of circumstances, 
 
STUD. 467 (1994). 
57. E.g., Roy J. Adams, Organizing Wal-Mart: The Canadian Campaign, 6 JUST LAB. 
1 (2005); Tony Dundon, Employer Opposition and Union Avoidance in the UK, 33 INDUS. 
REL. J. 234 (2002); Tony Royle, Just Vote No! Union-Busting in the European Fast-Food 
Industry: The Case of McDonald‟s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 262 (2002). But see Susan 
Christopherson, Challenges Facing Wal-Mart in the German Market, in WAL-MART 
WORLD: THE WORLD‟S BIGGEST CORPORATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 261 (Stanley D. 
Brunn ed., 2006); Kevin Kolben, Wal-Mart Is Coming, but It‟s Not All Bad: Wal-Mart and 
Labor Rights in Its International Subsidiaries, 12 UCLA J. INT‟L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 275 
(2007); Chris Tilly, Wal-Mart Goes South: Sizing Up the Chain‟s Mexican Success Story, in 
WAL-MART WORLD, supra, at 357. 
58. See Harry Arthurs, The Role of Global Law Firms in Constructing or Obstructing a 
Transnational Regime of Labour Law, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF 
GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 273 (Richard P. Appelbaum, William F. Felstiner & 
Volkmar Gessner eds., 2001). 
59. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding Our Boundaries: Transnational Employment 
Law Practice and the Export of American Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite, 25 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL‟Y J. 257 (2004); John Logan, The Union Avoidance Industry in the 
United States, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 651 (2006). 
60. See, e.g., Int‟l Labour Org. [ILO], Employment and Social Policy in Respect of 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs), ILO Doc. GB.286/ESP/3 (March 2003), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb286/pdf/esp-3.pdf; Joshua M. 
Kagan, Workers‟ Rights in the Mexican Maquiladora Sector: Collective Bargaining, 
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though unencumbered by local law, these firms may adopt decent HR practices 
approximating or mimicking those they apply to workers in their countries of 
origin.
61 
In the worst, however, EPZs may constitute a normative vacuum in 
whose workplaces “anything goes” and in which foreign enterprises may 
behave with ruthless disregard for the rights and well-being of their workers.
62
 
Sometimes, too, “smuggling” results from a tacit state policy of not 
enforcing labor laws against foreign firms. In such circumstances, workers are 
even more likely to experience severe coercion and exploitation. Indeed, even 
countries that usually take labor standards seriously have been known to treat 
foreign firms with unusual solicitude. To cite Canada as an example, in at least 
two documented cases, decisions of provincial labor boards that adversely 
affected transnational companies have been retroactively overturned by 
legislation;
63
 and suspicions have been voiced from time to time that labor laws 
have been enacted, interpreted, or enforced with a view to attracting or 
retaining foreign investors rather than protecting the rights of workers.
64
 This 
may be a far cry from extraterritoriality in its technical legal sense, but it may 
produce similar effects. 
Finally, the nonapplication of local labor law to foreign businesses may 
result not from a deliberate or tacit decision by the host government but from a 
joint decision of labor and management to apply some other legal regime. Two 
examples involving Canada and the United States illustrate the point. In 1967, 
the operations of Chrysler Corporation on both sides of the border were closely 
integrated, and its employees were all represented by locals of the United Auto 
Workers. A transnational collective agreement was negotiated under U.S. law 
that purported to cover both American and Canadian workers despite the fact 
 
Women‟s Rights, and General Human Rights: Law, Norms, and Practice, 15 J. TRANSNAT‟L 
L. & POL‟Y 153 (2005). 
61. See Ana Teresa Romero, Labour Standards and Export Processing Zones: 
Situation and Pressures for Change, 13 DEV. POL‟Y REV. 247 (2008); Dorsati Madani, A 
Review of the Role and Impact of Export Processing Zones (World Bank Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 2238, 1999). 
62. For a particularly egregious case, see ROBERT J.S. ROSS, SLAVES TO FASHION: 
POVERTY AND ABUSE IN THE NEW SWEATSHOPS 139-44 (2004) (concerning fashion 
sweatshops). 
63. Brian Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 523 (1981); 
Eric Tucker, Wal-Mart and the Remaking of Ontario Labour Law, 12 INT‟L UNION RTS. 10 
(2005). 
64. See Harry Arthurs, Who‟s Afraid of Globalization? Reflections on the Future of 
Labor Law, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 51 (John D.R. Craig & S. 
Michael Lynk eds., 2006); see also MAUDE BARLOW, THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE 
AMERICAS AND THE THREAT TO SOCIAL PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN CANADA AND THE AMERICAS (2001), available at http:// 
www.canadians.org/trade/documents/campaigns-ftaa-threat-barlow.pdf; Eric Tucker, “Great 
Expectations” Defeated?: The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and 
the United States Post-NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‟Y J. 97 (2004); North American 
Labor Federations Blast NAFTA, WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Aug. 26, 2009, http:// 
www.ww4report.com/node/7719. 
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that each group was in principle covered by the law of the jurisdiction in which 
it worked.
65
 A second example: professional sports leagues operating in cities 
in both the United States and Canada negotiate standard minimum salaries and 
working conditions with players‟ unions that purportedly bind all clubs in the 
two countries. These negotiations are also conducted within a framework of 
American labor legislation, despite the fact that the NLRB has excluded 
Canadian teams from the league bargaining unit,
66 
while its Ontario counterpart 




IV. CONTROLLING GLOBAL WORKPLACES: THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTORS 
Who actually controls global workplaces? As these examples demonstrate, 
actors other than states may play a decisive role in deciding the form and 
content of workplace governance. The most powerful of those actors— 
transnational corporations and their local executives, managers, and advisors— 
operate within but also across national borders, straddling the familiar 
regulatory domains of state and international law. They comprise a governance 
regime in themselves: they make their own law and, of course, do so primarily 
in their own interest. But corporations are not the only effective actors. Foreign 
unions and social movements, often working with their local counterparts as 
well as informal workplace-level and community organizations, may reinforce, 
implement, subvert, or replace local state law as well as the law generated by 
transnational corporations. The attempts by foreign unions and corporations to 
create, control, influence, defer to, reinforce, override, or destabilize local 
actors may lead both groups of transnational actors to be seen as imposing 
extraterritorial governance arrangements. And to the extent that they incite, 
welcome, co-opt, or resist the law generated by transnational actors, local 
actors are by choice or necessity implicated in the extraterritorialization of 
workplace governance. 
And where do workplace norms actually come from? To some extent, of 
course, global workplaces are regulated by labor laws enacted by home and 
host states; but to a considerable extent, workplace actors are the primary 
 
65. See David H. Blake, Multi-National Corporation, International Union and 
International Collective Bargaining: A Case Study of the Political, Social and Economic 
Implications of the 1967 U.A.W.-Chrysler Agreement, in TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 137 (Hans Günter ed., 1972). 
66. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1978), aff‟d, 613 F.2d 1379 
(5th Cir. 1980); ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM B. GOULD & PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, LABOR 
RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 31-34 (1986); RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 395-401 (5th ed. 2003). 
67. Nat‟l Basketball Referees Ass‟n v. Nat‟l Basketball Ass‟n, [Nov. 1995] O.L.R.B. 
Rep. 1389; Ass‟n of Major League Umpires v. Am. League & Nat‟l League of Prof‟l 
Baseball, [Nov. 1995] O.L.R.B. Rep. 540. 
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authors of the visible and invisible rules that govern employment relations on a 
daily basis. Moreover, these rules may not only differ from state law in terms of 
subject matter; they sometimes operate in direct contravention of the explicit 
requirements of state law.
68
 Often this results in workers being treated less well 
than one might anticipate in light of the “rights” they supposedly enjoy under 
state law, but sometimes the opposite is true: workers are able to limit employer 




This phenomenon of workplace normativity has been much studied in the 
literature of industrial relations and well-theorized in the literature of legal 
pluralism. However, it has received less attention than it deserves in the special 
context of globalization.
70
 I therefore turn next to a somewhat more detailed 
account of normativity in global workplaces, focusing particularly on the 
principal actors. 
A. Transnational Corporations 
A significant body of literature suggests that power and responsibility in 
leading transnational corporations have been redistributed from global 
headquarters to national and regional managers,
71
 that the directors and senior 
managers of the parent company are no longer drawn exclusively or primarily 
from the corporation‟s country of origin, and that corporate cultures have 
become “cosmopolitan” or “truly global” in character.
72
 On the other hand, 
there is considerable evidence to the contrary, much of which has been 
deployed in the lively debate over “the hollowing out of Corporate Canada”— 
the increasingly direct control exercised by American-based transnational 




68. See Arthurs, Landscape and Memory, supra note 4; Arthurs, Understanding Labour 
Law, supra note 4. 
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17 INT‟L SOC. 393 (2002); Andrew Jones, Truly Global Corporations? Theorizing 
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73. See H.W. Arthurs, The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada?, in GLOBALIZING 
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While both accounts of transnational corporate governance imply that 
foreign subsidiaries and suppliers may be subject to direction emanating from 
abroad, neither specifically addresses the means by which workplace 
normativity at the local level may be influenced by such controls. However, 
some recent studies carry forward this debate by exploring the actual modalities 
of control and assessing their implications for workplace normativity. One 
study, for example, assesses the extent to which local managers of transnational 
corporations are able to introduce new technologies and HR practices.
74
 
Another recounts how senior corporate executives actually secure adherence to 
higher labor standards by local managers far down the extended corporate 
value chain.
75
 More empirical work of a similar nature
76
 is clearly needed if we 
are to understand how workplace norms are constructed and enforced within 
such corporations. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to predict that studies 
will show that patterns of normativity and enforcement differ from one country, 
economic sector, time period, or corporation to another.
77
 
Even when transnational corporations do not smuggle labor laws across 
borders, they may nonetheless provoke “extraterritorial” consequences in the 
sense of preventing or subverting the application of local labor laws in 
countries where they do business. Corporations that are listed on global stock 
exchanges or that sell standard products in global markets must maintain tight 
financial discipline, dependability of supply, and consistent quality standards 
across their entire global operations, whether those operations are conducted by 
the corporation itself, by its subsidiaries, or by “arm‟s-length” suppliers. If 
costs rise, if inventories falter, or if quality fails in any one part of its 
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Santos eds., 2001); H.W. Arthurs, The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada: Implications 
for Transnational Labor Law, Policy and Practice, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 781 (2009). 
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INNOVATION (2006), available at http://www.crimt.org/PDFs/CRIMT_Report_on_MNCs_ 
in_Canada_September_2006.pdf. 
75. David Doorey, Transnational Domestic Labour Regulation: Using Domestic 
Regulation to Influence Foreign Labour Practices (Apr. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, York University) (on file with author). 
76. See, e.g., Anthony Ferner, Javier Quintanilla & Matthias Z. Varul, Country-of-
Origin Effects, and the Management of HR in Multinationals: German Companies in Britain 
and Spain, 36 J. WORLD BUS. 107 (2001); Matthias Schmitt & Dieter Sadowski, A Cost-
Minimization Approach to the International Transfer of the HRM/IR Practices: Anglo-Saxon 
Multinationals in the Federal Republic of Germany, 14 INT‟L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 409 
(2003). 
77. Kolben, supra note 57, at 298-312, suggests that even Wal-Mart, despite its 
aggressive antiunion policies, accepts unions in countries with corporatist labor laws where 
unions tend to be state controlled. And for a more general and nuanced account, see Jacques 
Bélanger & Paul Edwards, Towards a Political Economy Framework: TNCs as National and 
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TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 24 
(Anthony Ferner, Javier Quintanilla & Carlos Sanchez-Runde eds., 2006). 
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operations, the reputation and profitability of the entire global corporation may 
be put at risk. 
To forestall such outcomes, global corporations seek to tightly control unit 
costs of production, establish output quotas, and specify quality standards. And 
they enforce these prescriptions by firing delinquent local managers and getting 
rid of defaulting suppliers. Local managers and suppliers may thus find 
themselves between the rock of local labor standards and the hard place of 
corporate power. In such a context, many are likely to cling to the latter rather 
than the former.
78
 The result in fact, if not in law, is a kind of extraterritoriality. 
B. Transnational Unions and Union Alliances 
Workplace normativity is unlikely to be established unilaterally by 
employers; it is almost bound to be somewhat influenced by workers acting to 
defend their interests through informal shop-floor networks of resistance or 
through more formal means.
79
 
Informal shop-floor networks are, by definition, almost always local in 
character, but unions may well be organized transnationally. The most obvious 
examples of “international” unions are U.S.-based organizations that have 
established a Canadian region and/or Canadian locals. Significantly, while 





 as of 2007 they represent only 28%;
82
 a further decline is 
likely.
83
 In their heyday, as noted above, international unions often confronted 
the same employer on both sides of the border. Although bargaining was 
typically conducted on a workplace-by-workplace rather than on a company-
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by Canadian unions, and has declined most significantly in manufacturing and transportation 
in which international unions continue to play a significant role. See Andrew Jackson & 
Sylvain Schetagne, Solidarity Forever? An Analysis of Changes in Union Density, 4 JUST 
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wide or sectoral basis, agreements negotiated within a given time frame across 
a given firm or industry often provided for comparable wages and contained 
similar contract language.
84
 This is hardly surprising since both union and 
employer negotiators would have been aware that positions won or lost in one 
set of negotiations might have a precedential effect on others. Moreover, unions 
and employers on both sides of the border would have deployed negotiators 
whose philosophies, training, information base, and mandates were to some 
extent defined by their parent organizations. 
Nonetheless, as noted, North American “international” unionism has 
declined, even as continental economic integration has proceeded apace. Why? 
As tariff and other barriers between Canada and the United States were 
removed, workers in the two countries increasingly competed against each 
other for available work, and solidarity between them became more and more 
difficult to sustain. As American union membership and power shriveled, the 
ability of U.S. unions to support and control their Canadian locals diminished. 
As workers‟ prospects receded in a “new economy” shaped by globalization, 
technological change, and neoliberalism, the Canadian labor movement 
responded by consolidating its membership into larger unions, by maintaining 
its support for a social democratic agenda, and by forging links with other 
social movements; the American union movement took fewer comparable 
initiatives. For all these reasons, the direct influence of “international” unions 
over Canadian workers declined—nowhere more dramatically than in the auto 
industry, the most completely integrated industry of all, in which the Canadian 
wing seceded from the “international.”
85
 
While the North American case may be unique, it helps to explain the 
limited role played by transnational unions and union alliances in shaping 
workplace normativity elsewhere. Differences of economic interest, political 
orientation, technical resources, and regulatory frameworks make union cross-
border cooperation very difficult indeed. This is not to say that such 
cooperation is unknown or necessarily ineffectual. Unions have formed 
international alliances with a view to promoting concerted action by all workers 
employed by a single employer or in a single sector.
86
 In Europe, at least, these 
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alliances have sometimes managed to organize coordinated strategies.
87
 
Individual unions have also established ties with their counterparts in 
developing countries and provided them with technical, financial, and political 
support,
88
 and, on occasion, sympathetic action.
89
 But these efforts have been 
at best episodic. International unions (except in Canada)
90
 have not won an 
explicit place within established regulatory or negotiating structures in national 
industrial relations systems, and they have sometimes been accused of 
“interference” and “self-interest” by hostile states, employers, and, on occasion, 
even those who purport to speak on behalf of workers.
91
 Unions, in other 
words, have not been particularly successful as agents of extraterritoriality. 
C. Transnational Social Movements 
Something similar might be said of transnational social movements based 
in the global north, with which unions often cooperate, albeit sometimes 
tentatively.
92
 These movements have had some success in organizing consumer 
boycotts, lawsuits, and governmental sanctions to force abusive local 
employers to abide by international labor norms and human rights standards; to 
ensure that workers are paid a living wage even when local law permits 
extreme exploitation; to guarantee gender equality and safe working conditions 
in the workplace when local laws to this effect are nonexistent or unenforced; 
and to protect the right of workers to bargain collectively when local managers 
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To the extent that these campaigns succeed in transforming local working 
conditions, it can be said that transnational social movements promote 
“extraterritoriality by other means.” The question remains, however, whether 
they can sustain their influence over the long term and at the local level. Their 
best hope for doing so appears to lie in persuading transnational corporations to 
adopt, implement, and monitor codes of conduct that will effectively control 
the behavior of local managers and contractors. There is good reason to be 
skeptical about why corporations might choose to adopt these codes and 
whether they will abide by them.
94
 But there is also some recent empirical 
evidence to suggest that well-designed codes drafted with input from workers, 
unions, and social movements, internalized as a fundamental aspect of a 
corporation‟s culture and implemented by it as transparently and robustly as 
other indicators of corporate performance, may indeed alter conditions in its 
workplaces around the world.
95
 So far, this evidence covers a limited set of 
transnational corporations in a few industries over a relatively short period of 
time. But, if a scattering of single instances grows into a widespread and 
sustained trend, transnational social movements will indeed have exercised 
extraterritorial influences over workplace normativity all down the value chain 
of transnational corporations. 
D. Transnational Monitoring Agencies 
It is often contended, and with reason, that effective monitoring at the 
workplace level is indispensable to achieving respect for labor standards. But 
effective monitoring is a challenge even within well-designed and well-funded 
state systems of regulation. Workplaces are geographically dispersed and 
functionally diverse; workforces are constantly turning over; technologies, 
management systems, and working conditions are constantly reinvented. It is 
clearly impossible for any system of labor inspectors to be present everywhere, 
all the time, and with adequate resources to identify every unlawful workplace 
practice. Consequently, labor standards regimes tend to depend on educating 
workers and employers about their rights and duties, on occasional inspections 
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and compliance audits, and on the prosecution of delinquent employers in 
response to complaints by aggrieved employees (who will almost always be ex-
employees by the time they complain).
96
  
In light of these problems, it will surely be even more difficult to achieve 
effective monitoring at the workplace level in global enterprises where labor 
standards are likely to be extraterritorial in their origin: no public inspectorate 
or auditors, no courts or formal legal sanctions, no governing statute, and no 
authoritative interpretations of broadly framed rights to receive a living wage, 
bargain collectively, or be protected from unsafe working conditions.
97
 Indeed, 
in the context of extended global value chains comprising multiple layers of 
subsidiaries, contractors, and subcontractors, it is often difficult even to identify 




Nonetheless, through the efforts of transnational unions, employers, and 
social movements, as well as national governments and international 
organizations, some progress is being made towards the development of 
effective workplace-level compliance strategies. Some leading apparel 
companies provide a list of all their contractors and subcontractors online, and 
legislation has been proposed that would make disclosure of such information 
mandatory for all.
99
 Some companies have established their own arm‟s-length 
monitoring systems, often in cooperation with unions and social movements,
100
 
and a whole industry of compliance auditors has grown up to ensure the 
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initiatives undertaken by the ILO in cooperation with governments and other 
transnational actors—notably in Cambodia—have mobilized local teams of 
inspectors that visit significant numbers of workplaces.
102
 And at least one 
American court has mandated regular on-site inspections as part of a 




CONCLUSION: COPING WITH THE INEVITABLE 
Extraterritoriality may be inevitable, but in the various extended senses in 
which I have used the term, it is neither intrinsically disadvantageous to 
workers, nor necessarily an infringement of the sovereignty and policy 
prerogatives of host states. Transnational corporations sometimes offer their 
offshore workers better working conditions than local employers; powerful 
states sometimes force or persuade their trading partners to adhere to higher 
labor standards than they might otherwise do.
104
 And of course there is 
evidence that globalization has had equal and opposite effects. But whether 
globalization triggers a “race to the top,” as its proponents argue, or a “race to 
the bottom,” as is widely believed by its critics, no one will deny that ensuring 
workplace-level compliance with decent labor standards presents a formidable 
challenge for even the most principled global employers, the most militant 
international unions, the most persevering transnational social movements, and, 
for that matter, the most labor-friendly governments and international agencies. 
One reason for this difficulty is extraterritoriality—the unwillingness or 
inability of states to extend the reach of their traditional national-level 
command-and-control models of labor regulation into the broader global 
economy. Another is that the models themselves are seen to lack efficacy—
and, therefore, credibility—even in the domestic context.
105
 “Command,” after 
all, is difficult to imagine when the state is indifferent, indisposed, or absent 
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altogether; and “control” is difficult to assert if it has no coercive forces to 
deploy or when its writ does not run beyond the nearest international border. 
However, regulation theorists have begun to explore new models of 
regulation with novel approaches to both “command” and “control.” To cite 
one example, “reflexive law” posits the need for states to use their limited legal 
resources circumspectly, primarily to ensure the organizational and procedural 
integrity of other regimes of social ordering, such as the economy, which must 
be left largely to regulate themselves so long as they comply with broadly 
acceptable “constitutional” norms.
106
 To cite another, “new governance theory” 
argues that states—and state proxies such as international agencies—should be 
more pragmatic, that they can and must employ an array of hard and soft law 
measures, of sanctions and incentives, of direct and indirect measures, to 
achieve their objectives.
107
 And to cite a third, proponents of “ratcheting labor 
standards” hope to harness market incentives and a regime of transparency to 
prompt employers to embark on a virtuous cycle of self-improvement.
108
 In the 
absence of state or international agencies with regulatory capacity at the global, 
national, or workplace levels, such approaches may indeed be the last, best 
hope for decent labor standards in the global economy. However, they all 
assume that, ultimately, powerful corporate actors can be induced to “do the 
right thing”—whether to forestall state action, to win recognition and market 
share as socially responsible employers, to secure access to state subsidies and 
contracts, or simply to avoid adverse publicity and consumer boycotts. 
In my view, this assumption is overly optimistic.
109
 In deciding how to 
treat their workers, corporations adopt a rational calculus: will adhering to 
decent and more costly labor standards yield a net advantage over the opposite 
strategy? That calculus is radically altered if substandard labor conditions 
cannot be detected by state inspectors or suppressed by state law; if unions, 
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social movements, and aroused consumers, unable to sustain lengthy 
international boycotts, cannot ultimately shift the burdens of securing 
compliance to states or state proxies; or if “good” domestic employers cannot 
persuade states to shelter them from unfair competition by “bad” firms that 
exploit their workers at home or abroad. 
Extraterritoriality is an inevitable aspect of any corporate calculus, I would 
argue, and consequently of the calculus of all labor market actors, including 
states themselves. By identifying the “other means” by which extraterritoriality 
occurs—means implicit in the extended definitions of “law” and “labor” 
proffered at the beginning of this essay—I have attempted to liberate debates 
over regulation of the global workplace from limits imposed by the 
conventional discourses of public and private international law. But this is just 
a first step. If we aspire to improve the conditions of workers in these 
workplaces, we must understand better than we do now the transnational 
migration of state laws and policies, of normativity generated within corporate, 
social, and discursive networks, and of workplace-level strategies of 
exploitation, resistance, and regulation. We must understand as well the 
dynamic relationship amongst these and their relationship to developments in 
nonlabor policy domains and in the global political economy more generally. 
The next step is therefore to develop a conceptual and analytical framework, 
and especially a body of empirical evidence, that will enable us to think more 
rigorously, to see more clearly, and especially to look to the future more 
constructively than I have been able to do in this preliminary exploration of 
extraterritoriality. 
 
